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Nov. 19.1957.1

GERTRUDE LEWIS, Appellant, v. ULYSSES LEWIS,
Respondent.

/)

[1] Divorce-Foreign Divorce-Collateral Attac'.k.-A wife who
secured a Judgment of separatt' maintenanc~ m Illinois (th ...
state of her domIcile) after th... rendition of a valid divorct"
decree for the husband in Nevada was not precluded from
enforcing bel' nght to iI1lpport in CalifOrnIa. the state of tbf
husband's present dom1cile. where the husband did not iDvob
the Nevada divorcl' dec.rel' in the min01!' proceeding: even if
sucb decree had been pleaded as a defense m that proceedi~
and the llliDois court had erroneously failed to recogmze 1t
the husband's remedy was by appeal and he cannot attack tb ...
Dlinois judgment· in a subseqnent pl'oceedi~ in California to
enforce th ... wiffl's riJrht to support.
.

[I} See Oal.Jur.2c1,. I)jvorce and Separation. § 31th Am.Jur..
Divorce and Separation. § 742 et seq.
MeB.. Dig. References: (1) Divorce, § 307; [2, S, 6,1 Divorce,
1$ 304; [4) Divorce, § 306.1; [5) Divorce, § 305.
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[2J Id.-Foreign Divorce-Full Faith and Credit.-A Nevada di
vorce court baving no personal ,jurisdiction over tbe wife has
no power to terminate a husband's obligation to provide her
support as required by Illinois law, and neither the Illinois
court nor the Supreme Court of California, the state of the
husband's present domicile, is obliged to recognize that part
of a Nevada divorce decree for the husband purporting to
terminate the wife's right to support in Illinois, where the
wife has maintained her domicile. (Disapproving· Ohirg1D'n v.
Ohirg1Din, 26 Cal.App.2d 506, 79 P.2d 772.),
[3] Id.-Foreign Divorce-Effect on Wife's Bight to Support.The effect on a wife's right to support of a foreign ell: parte
divorce secured by the husband is determined by reference to
the law of the state of the wife's domicile at the time of the
divorce.
[4] Id. - Foreign Divorce - Res Judieata.-A contention that a
judgment of separate maintenance obtained by the wife in
Dlinois, the state in which she was domiciled at the time she
secured the judgment, after the rendition of an ell: parte
divorce decree for the husband in Nevada, was unauthorized
by minois law should have been raised in the Illinois proceeding and is res judicata in a subsequent proceeding in California
to establish said judgment.
[6] Id. - Foreign Divorce - Judgment for AlimoD'7 or Separate
Kaintenance.-As to all accrued instalments not subject to
modification by the court rendering the original order, an
order for the payment of money as alimony rendered by a
court of competent jurisdiction in one state must be recognized
by all other states under the full faith and credit clause of
the United States Constitution, and such an order is also
recognized in California as to future payments.
[6] Id.-Foreign Divorce-Supplemental Judgment Order.-Hav·
ing acquired jurisdiction of the subject matter and of the
parties in a divorce action brought by the husband, an
Dlinois court retained jurisdiction to modify and enforce
its support order and therefore had jurisdiction, after the
husband obtained an ex parte divorce decree in Nevada, to
enter a supplemental judgment order ft:s:ing the amount of
accrued arrearages; the husband, however, was entitled to
notice of the proceedings culmiuating in that order and, if no
notice was given him, the order is unenforceable.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County. ,-4: F. Moroney, Judge. Affirmed in parf
and reversed in part with directions.
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[49 C.2d 389: 317 P.2d 9871

Action to establish and enforce a foreign judgment for separate maintenance, and to recover the amounts unpaid thereunder. Judgment for defendant affirmed in part and re\"ersed in part with directions.
Brock, Easton, Fleishman & Rykoff and Robert L. Brock for
~\ppellant.

Sidney A. Cherniss and Louis Miller for Respondent.
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TRAYNOR, J .-The parties were husband and wife and
were domiciled in Illinois. In 1944, the husband, defendant
herein, brought an action for divorce in an Illinois court. The
wife, plaintiff herein, answered and cross-complained for separate maintenance. Defendant answered the cross-complaint.
Thereafter, he established his domicile in Nevada and, on
August 27, 1947, brought an action for divorce in a court
of that state, disclosing the pendency of the Illinois action
and giving notice to plaintiff by serving her personally in the
state of Illinois. (Of, Walker v. Oity of Hutchinson, 352
U.S. 112 [77 S.Ct. 200, 202-203,1 L.Ed.2d 178].) She did not
appear. The Illinois court sought unsuccessfully to enjoin
defendant from prosecuting the Nevada action. On September 30, 1947, the Nevada court entered its judgment granting
defendant a default divorce and ordering that the parties
were" . . . released from the obligations of the marriage and
restored to the status of single persons.' '. Soon thereafter
the divorce action in Illinois came to trial. Defendant did
not pursue his complaint or defend against the plaintiff's
cross-complaint.. On December 30, 1947, the Illinois court
entered judgment for plaintiff on her cross-complaint, making
permanent its prior temporary order that defendant pay
plaintiff $18 a week for her support. By a "judgment order"
entered in the Illinois action on December 12, 1950, the
Illinois court found defendant in default on the weekly payments in the sum of $3,078. Defendant remarried shortly
after entry of the Nevada decree and is now a resident of
California. According to his own testimony he has made no
payments to plaintift' since October or November of 1947.
Plaintiff resides in Illinois and has not remarried.
-The decree would te~inate plaintiff '8 right to support if she were
a Nevada domiciliary. (Bummer, v. Bummer" 69 Nev. 83, 85·86, 92·93
[241 P.2d 1091]; Herrick v. Herrick, 55 Nev. 59, 68 [25 P.2d 318J;
Sweeney v. SweeMY, 42 Nev. 431, 438·439 [119 P. 638].)
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Plaintiff uJ'onght this action to establish the lllinois Judg·
ment of Decclllher 30, 1947 and the subsequent .. judgment
order" of Decemhl'r 12, 1950, as judgments in t.his state and
to recover the amounts unpaid thereunder. Defendant cross·
complained to establisb the validity of the Nevada decree
The trial court entered judgment for defendant. concluding
that the Nevada decree terminated his obligation to support
plaintiff and that the minoi!'! judgments are" . invalid and
unenforceable as against dE'fendant.
and are not entitled
to recognition in this court or in this State." Plaintiff
appeals.
Plaintiff contends that the Illinois court had jurisdiction
to adjudicate her right to support and that the Hlinois judg·
ment of December 30. 1947. and the nIinois "judgment
order" of December 12, 1950 are entitled to recognition in this
state under the ful] faith and credit clausE' of thE' United
States Constitution. (U.S Const., art. TV. § 1: 28 U.S.C.
§ 1738.) Defendant contends that the Nevada decree ter·
minated the marriage and plaintiff's right to support and left
the minoiE; court without a "res" upon which to act and that
the minois judgment and .. judgment order" were therefore
entered without jurisdiction and are not entitled to recogni.
tion in this state. He also contends that even if the 1947
judgment is a valid adjudication of his obligation to support
plaintiff. the 1950 "judgment order" is void because he was
not given notice of the proceedings reSUlting in that order,
and that recovery under the 1947 judgment for payments that
became due more than Bve years before Angust 26, 1954,
the date of the commencement of this action, is barred by the
five-year limitation on actions on judgments found prior to
1953 in subdivision 1 of section 336 of the Califoruia Code
of Civil Procedure.- Plaintiff agrees that if the 1950 "judg·
ment order" is void, recovery of thepayment!l due prior to
August 26. 1949. is barred as defendant contends.
Defendant acknowledges the settled rule that when a wife
has secured a judgment of separate maintenance in the state
of her domici1e, her right to support thereunder will survive
a subsequent valid. ex parte, foreign decree of divorce secured
by her husband if the law of her domicile so provides.
(Estin v. Est1.n, 334 U.S. 541 r68 S.Ct. 1213. 92 L.Ed. 1561,
1 A.TJ.R2rl 14121 . o/-nrfhley v Worthley. 44 Cal.2d 465 f283

.

-Defendant did not plead seetion 36] ot the California Code ot Civil
ProcedurE' nor the llIinoie statute ot limitations ap~lieable thereunder.
(See B~w/1t1d Y. B~1&/171d. 17 Cal.2d 108, 114·117 109 P.2d 701, 18'
A.L.B. 12641; BI," Y. S"/1GfA, 119 Cal. 526, 527-529 51 P. Maj.)
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P.2d 19J i Pope v. Pop*" 2 Il1.2d 152 1117 N.E.2d 65J.) He
contends, however. relying on Ohtrgwin v Oht.rgwln. 26 Oal
App.2d 506 [79 P.2d 7721, that a wife may not enforce a
support order obtained by her in the state of her domicilt'
after the rendition of a valid. ex parte. foreign divorce decret'
in favor of her husband. (See also De Young v. De Young.
27 Oal.2d 521 [165 P.2d 4571; Oardinale v. Oardinale. 8 Oal
2d 762 [68 P.2d 3511; Proper v. Proper, 102 Oal.App.2d 612
[228 P.2d 62] ; Ooleman v Ooleman. 92 Oal.App.2d 312 {206
P.2d 1093]; Patterson v. Patterson, 82 Oal.App.2d 838 [187
P.2d 113] j Oalhoun v. Oalhoun. 70 Oal.App.2d 233 1160 P.2d
923].} [1] The first answer to this contention is that it
should have been invoked in the Hlinois proceeding and that
even if the Nevada decree had been pleaded as a defense in
that proceeding and the Hlinois court had erroneously failed
to recognize it. defendant's remedy was by appeal and he
cannot now attack the Illinois .judgment. (Treinies v. Sun.
shine Min. 00., 308 U.S 66. 78 f 60 S.Ot. 44, 84 L.Ed. 85] ;
Morris v. Jones. 329 U.S. 545. 551-552 [67 S.Ot. 451, 91 L.Ed
488. 168 A.L.R. 656J; see Rest., Judgments § 13.) [a] The
second answer is that even if defendant could now attack the
Illinois judgment, the recent decision of the ·United States
Supreme Oourt in Vanderbt.'lt v. Vanderbilt, 354 U.S. 416 [77
S.Ct. 1360. 1 L.Ed.2d 1456J, demonstrates that his contention
is without merit. The husband in the Vanderbilt case secured
an ex parte Nevada divorce. Subsequently, the wife brought
an action against the husband for support in a New York
court. In affirming an award to the wife, the court stated:
"In Eslin v. Estin ... this Court decided that a Nevada di·
vorce court, which had no personal jurisdiction over the wife,
had no power to terminate a husband's obligation to provide
her support as required in a pre-existing New York sepa·
ration decree. The factor which distinguishes the present
case from Estin is that here the wife's right to support had not
been reduced to judgment prior to the husband's ex parte
divorce. In our opinion this difference is not material on the
question before us. Since the wife was not subject to its juris·
diction, the Nevada divorce court had no power to extinguish
any right which she had under the law of New York to
financial support from her husband. It has long been the
constitutional rule ~at a court cannot adjudicate a personal
claim or obligation unless it has jurisdiction over the person
of the defendant. Here. the Nevada divorce court was as
powerless to cut off the wife's support right as it would have
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been to order the husband to pay alimony if the wife had
brought the divorce action and he had not been subject to the
divorce court's juri~diction." (354 U.S. at 418-419 [77 S.Ct.
at 1362-1363].) The court held "Therefore, the Nevada
decree, to the extent it purported to a1iect the wife's right
to support, was void and the Full Faith and Credit Clause
did not obligate New York to give it recognition." (354 U.S.
at 419 [77 S.Ct. at 1363]; see also concurring opinion in
Armstrong v. Armstrong, 350 U.S. 568, 575 [76 S.Ct. 629.
100 L.Ed. 705}.)
In this case, therefore, the Illinois" 'court was not
obliged to recognize that part of the Nevada judgment purporting to terminate plainti1i's right to support under Illinois
law, nor are we. Chirgwin v. Chirgwin, supra, 26 CaI.App.2d
506, is inconsistent with the Vanderbilt case and is therefore
disapproved. The other California cases referred to above in
connection with defendant's contention that his obligation to
support plainti1i was terminated by the Nevada decree are
not in point. [3] The e1iect on a wife's right to support
of a foreign, ex parte divorce secured by her husband is determined by reference to the law of the state of the wife's
domicile at the time of the divorce, in this case the law of
Illinois. (See Estin v. Estin, supra, 334 U.S; at 544, 547;
Buttrm v. Lei-b, 342 U.S. 402, 406 [72 S.Ct. 398, 96 L.Ed. 448] ;
Esenwein v. Commonwealth, 325 U.S. 279, 280-281 [65 S.Ct.
1118,89 L.Ed. 1608, 157 A.L.R. 1396] ; Worthley v. Worthley,
supra, 44 Cal.2d at 468; Biewend v. Biewend, 17 Ca1.2d 108,
111, 114 [109 P.2d 701, 132 A.L.R. 1264]; Vanderbilt v.
Vanderbilt, 1 N.Y.2d 342 [135 N.E.2d 553, 557-558} ; Morris,
Div4sible Divorce, 64 Harv.L.Rev. 1287, 1302.
Illinois was the state of domicile of both defendant and
plaintiff when the Illinois action was brought and was the
state of plainti1i's domicile when the judgment was entered.
[4] Defendant contends that the judgment was unauthorized
by Illinois law, citing Knowlton v. Knowlton, 155 Ill. 158, 165
[39 N.E. 595} and two Illinois statutes. (Ill.Rev.Stat.
1953, ch. 40, par. 19 [Jones Ann.Stat. 109.186J; Ill.Rev.Stat.
1953; ch. 68, par. 22 [Jones Ann.Stat. 109.189}.) This COJl~
tention should have been raised in the Illinois proceeding and
is. res judicata. Moreover, the Illinois law is now settled contraryto defendant's contention. Speaking of the Knowlton
case, the Supreme OOurt of Illinois said in Pope v. Pope, 2 Ill~
2d 152, 156 [117'N.E.2d 65] : "It appears. '.. that the decision was not based on Illinois law but on a supposed require.
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ment of the full faith and credit clause which may no longer
exist. See Thompson v. Thompson, 226 U.S. 551 [33 S.Ct.
129, 57 L.Ed. 347J; Estin v. Estin, 334 U.S. 541, 546 [68
S.Ct. 1213, 92 L.Ed. 1561, 1 A.L.R.2d 14121, note 4." It IS
now definitely established that the supposed full faith and
credit requirement on which Knowlton was based does not
exist. (Vanderbilt v. Vanderbilt, supra, 354 U.S. 416 [77 S.Ct.
1360J.) Any doubt that under the law of Illinois tbe right
to support survives a foreign ex parte divorce was laid at rest
by the Supreme Court of Illinois in the Pope case: c~A decree
of divorce enables tbe parties to contract a new marriage;
tbat it does not necessarily relieve them of all tb:! obligations
of the old is witnessed by the award of alimony upon, or even
after divorce." (2 Il1.2d at 157.) "Occasional suggestions
in our opinions that divorce terminates the right to support or
kindred property rights [citations] must be considered as
referring only to those situations where the wife has participated in the proceedings, or where a contract between
the parties was construed to require this result." (2 Ill.2d
at 158.)
[5] The question next to be considered is whether the
Illinois judgment of December 30, 1947, is entitled to recognition in California. Payments past due under an TIlinois separate maintenance. decree are not subject to modification in
TIlinois. (Stewart v. Stewart, 1 Ill.App.2d 283, 286 [117
N.E.2d 579] and cases there cited.) As to all accrued instalments not subject to modification by tbe court rendering
the original order, an order for tbe payment of money as
alimony rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction in one
state must be recognized by all other states under the full
faith and credit clause of the United States Constitution.
(Biewend v. Biewencl, supra, 17 Ca1.2d at 110-111 and cases
cited.) Such an order is also recognized in California as to
future payments. (Biewend v. Biewend, supra, 17 Ca1.2d at
113; Worthley v. Worthley, supra, 44 Ca1.2d at 474.)
[6] The final question concerns the effect to be given the
supplemental judgment order of the Illinois court of December 12, 1950. Having acquired jurisdiction of the subject matter and of the parties in the divorce action brought by defendant, the Illinois court retained jurisdiction to modify and
enforce its support oJ'{ler. (Karr v. Rust,217 Ill.App. 555, 561;
Adam v. Saenger/803 U.S. 59, 67-68 [58 S.Ct. 454, 82 L:Ed.
649] ; Michigan Trust Co. v. Ferry, 228 U.S. 346, 353 [33 S.Ct.
550, 57 L.Ed. 867]; Rest., Conflict of Laws, §§ 76, 105.) It

)
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therefore had Juri.c;diction to enter the supplempntal .. jlld~
ment order" of Del'l'mber 12. 1950. fixing the amount of a('
crued arrearages Nevertheless. defendant w~ entitled tit
notice of the proceedIngs cuhniuatinfl in that order. and if no
notice was given him. the order is unenforceable (GrifJi:" v
Grit/in.327 U.S 220.228 [66 S.Ct. 556. gO L.Ed 6351. Haut
Inan v KaUfman. 279 Ul.App I, 4: Cltmmer v Cllmmer. 28:~
m.App. 220. 235; W orthte1l v. Worthley. supra. 44 Ca1.2d 465.
469, 471.) Defendant testified and the trial court found that
with respect to the 1950 proceedings defendant was not served
with summons or other process and did not appear personally
or by counsel. There was no evidence and no finding as to
whether service was made upon the attorney who represented
defendant in the original action. (See Bevnolds v. Reynolds.
21 Oa1.2d 580. 583 [134 P.2d 251).) Under [llinois law, bow·
ever, such service would apparently not suffice as notice to
defendant. (Cummer v. Cummer, supra, 283 ru.App.at
235-237.) Nevertheless, it is obvious that tbe finding made
by the trial court is not a finding that defendant bad no
notice. The finding is simply tbat he was not served and that
he did not appear. [n view of the court's continuing juris·
diction over defendant in matters relating to modification
an:d enforcement of the support order, the .question is not
whether he was served or appeared but whether be bad notice.
Service in a technical sense is not required.. Actual notice
is sufficient. (See Griffin v. Griffin, supra, 327 U.S. at 228;
Oummer v. Oummer, supra, 283 Ill.App. at 237; see MuUane
v. Central Hanover Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 et seq. [70
S.Ot. 652, 94 L.Ed. 865] ; Walker v. City of Hutchw01&, supra,
77 S.Ct. at 202.) There is no evidence from which we can
determine whether or not defendant had notice. This fact
can be ascertained on retrial.
If defendant had no notice of the 1950 proceedings, the
., judgment order" of December 12, 1950, is unenforceable,
and plaintiff's rights must be determined und~r the judgment
of December 12, 1947. Recovery for payments due there·
under prior to August 26. 1949. is barred by the five-year
statute of limitations found prior to 1953 in subdivision 1 of
section 336 of the Code of Civil Procedure. (See Chambers
v. Gallagher, 177 Cal. 704, 708·709 [171 P. 931].) If de·
fendant had notice of the 1950 proceedings, the co judgment
order" of DecemJler 12, 1950, is a valid judgment entitled
to recognition rider the full faith and credit clause of the
United States Constitution, and the applicable statute Of
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limitations is the lO-year statute found in section 337.5 of the
Code of Civil Procedure as amended in 1953. (See Mudd v
McColgan. 30 Cal.2d 463. 468 [183 P.2d 10].)
The judgment is affirmed insofar as it determines that
the Nevada decree terminated the marital status of the parnell
and is reversed in aU other respects for furt~er proceedings
in accordance with the views expressed herein.

/:)

Gibson. C. J., Shenk, J., Carter, J., Schauer, J., Spence.
•J., and McComb J., concurred.

Respondent's petition for a rehearing was denied December
17. 1957. and the judgment was modified to read as printed

above.
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